Taxation: Exemption of Property Owned by Educational Institutions in California by Coffman, Ralph L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 11
1-1958
Taxation: Exemption of Property Owned by
Educational Institutions in California
Ralph L. Coffman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Ralph L. Coffman, Taxation: Exemption of Property Owned by Educational Institutions in California, 9 Hastings L.J. 215 (1958).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol9/iss2/11
In the case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co.,26 it was noted by the
United States Supreme Court that the bargaining authority conferred upon a
union under the Railway Labor Act was not unlike the power of a legislature. It
may govern the working life as effectively as a legislature may control living con-
ditions in general. It should therefore be subject to the same constitutional limita-
tions. Reasonably, it would not have to be shown that the union exercising the
bargaining power was the exclusive agent under the terms of the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Peace Act or similar labor legislation since, as was noted in the dissent-
ing opinion of the Ross case:
S... the plain facts of economic life demonstrate that the possibility of so small a
minority forming as an effective organization when the defendant is already estab-
lished in the field is illusory. 2 7
Wherever a union is established, workers may be bound by a union arbitration. 28
Their grievances might necessarily be settled by union representatives. 29 They
might even be victims of conscious or unconscious discrimination on the part of
the employer seeking the favor and good will of the union. Yet, they might still be
unreasonably kept from taking part in, or voting for, the formulation of the poli-
cies which govern them. This is the wrong which should be remedied.
The court having based its decision upon a concept of a union as a voluntary
association whose acts are not such as to be termed state action, it should be sub-
mitted as a conclusion that a different and a better result might have been reached
by a more realistic view of what the functions of a union are. There should have
been a less rigid view of what constitutes state action in which the essential public
nature of the union was emphasized. The stress should have been placed on the
source of power and authority of the union rather than upon its individual and
private aspects as an organization.
T. C. Black
TAXATION: EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY OWNED BY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
IN CALIFORNIA
The determination of which property owned by educational institutions is
exempt from California property tax requires an interpretation of section la, arti-
cle XIII of the California Constitution whicl reads as follows:
"Any educational institution of collegiate grade, within the State of California, not
conducted for profit, shall hold exempt from taxation its buildings and equipment,
its grounds within which its buildings are located, not exceeding 100 acres in area, its
securities and income used exclusively for the purposes of education." (Emphasis
added.)
How encompassing is this provision? Should the exemption extend to property
other than the actual buildings in which instruction is carried on?
The District Court of Appeal of California in the case of The Church Divinity
School of the Pacific v. County of Alameda' held that faculty residences, student
26323 U.S. 192 (1944).
27 Supra note 1 at 530, 82 N.W.2d at 322.
28 Wis. STAT. § 111.06 (1953).
29 Ibid.
1 152 A.CA. 534, 314 P.2d 209 (1957).
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parking lots and married students' residences were within the exemption as stated
in the constitutional provision. The court, in examining the constitutional pro-
vision, determined that a requirement of exemption is the necessity that the
grounds, buildings and equipment be "used exclusively for the purposes of edu-
cation." The court reached this conclusion by holding that this exemption afforded
educational institutions is analogous to that given welfare and religious institu-
tions in section 1c, article XIII of the California Constitution.2 In previous cases3
the Supreme Court of California has interpreted the provision applicable to wel-
fare and religious institutions to make exempt all property "used exclusively" by
such institutions. There is little doubt that this is a correct construction of the
phrase in the welfare and religious provision which reads:
".. . the Legislature may exempt from taxation all or any portion of property used
exclusively for religious, hospital or charitable purposes . . .", (emphasis added).4
Therefore, the California Supreme Court, in deciding exactly what property was
to fall under the exempting provision as "used exclusively for religious, hospital
or charitable purposes," used a "strict but reasonable" rule and broader inter-
pretations.5
The court applied this analogy in holding that the property in question would
be exempt from taxation 6 as there had been no prior California decision interpret-
ing the educational provision. In applying this interpretation by analogy, however,
the court failed to examine the differences in grammatical construction between
the two provisions or their underlying intent. The court merely assumed that the
term was to be interpreted the same way in both provisions, and cited cases to
show that "used exclusively" was liberally interpreted in the welfare provision so
as to favor the exempting of as much property belonging to religious and welfare
institutions as possible. If the court had examined differences between the two
provisions, it might have found a sounder basis for its decision.
In a recent article,7 Mr. F. E. Loy presented the basis of a distinction between
the two provisions and an interpretation of the provision appertaining to educa-
tional institutions.
Mr. Loy posed the following question: Is it required that college property in
California be "used exclusively for the purposes of education" to be exempt under
the constitution? It should be noted here that the court in the principal case did
not make this inquiry since it applied "used exclusively" to the entire educational
provision, and the only question thus presented was that of interpreting what
property was so used so as to come within the statute.
Mr. Loy then presented his reasoning for suggesting that college property need
not be "used exclusively for the purposes of education" to be exempt under the
constitutional provision. First of all, a close examination of the grammatical con-
2 ,,... the Legislature may exempt from taxation all or any portion of property used
exclusively for religious, hospital or charitable purposes and owned by community chests, funds,
foundations or corporations organized and operated for religious, hospital or charitable pur-
poses, not conducted for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual."
3 Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956) ; Cedars of Lebanon
Hospital v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950).
4 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § ic.
5 152 A.C.A. at 538, 314 P.2d at 212.
6 Ibid.
7 F. E. Loy, Tax Exemption of College Property in California, 31 L.A.B. BuLL. 99 (1956).
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struction of the educational provision should be made to determine how "used
exclusively was meant to be applied. In the provision that
"[educational institutions] shall hold exempt from taxation its buildings and equip-
ment, its grounds within which its buildings are located, not exceeding 100 acres in
area, its securities and income used exclusively for the purposes of education." (Em-
phasis added.)
Mr. Loy contends that a comma would be needed between the words "income"
and "used" to correctly apply the "used exclusively" clause to the entire section.
As the section now stands, it could reasonably be interpreted two ways: as exempt-
ig all property of educational institutions, and that income derived from any
source which is used exclusively for the purposes of education, or as exempting
only property used exclusively for the purposes of education. In other words, the
"used exclusively" clause could apply to all of the nouns---"buildings and equip-
ment," "grounds," "securities" and "income," or merely to "income" alone. Since,
as has been shown previously, the "used exclusively" clause in the welfare pro-
vision does apply to all property owned by the institutions, the two sections are
not similar enough to apply the interpretation of one to the other automatically
as was done by the court.
The two possible interpretations of the educational provision indicate that an
ambiguity is present. When such is the case in a constitutional provision or in a
statute, it is necessary to look to the intent of the legislators at the time they en-
acted the provision.8 The provision in question was enacted in 1914. Prior to that
time, there was no tax exemption in California which applied to educational insti-
tutions generally. However, special acts had been passed by the legislature grant-
ing exemptions to individual educational institutions. All of these special acts
exempted property of the particular school involved, regardless of the use to which
the property was put (with the exception of certain properties of Stanford Uni-
versity). There were a number of educational institutions which were not covered
by these special acts. As was pointed out in the opinion in the principal case,
"One of the purposes of the 1914 amendment was to treat all colleges in the same
manner and abolish discrimination in favor of certain institutions."9
Thus, if the intent of the legislature was to put all educational institutions on an
equal footing with those already provided for, the purpose of the provision would
not be to exempt only property "used exclusively" for education, but all property
of educational institutions, because all the property of those institutions already
provided for was exempt from taxation. The intent of the legislature could also
have been to provide equal exemptions for all educational institutions by only
holding exempt that property "used exclusively for the purposes of education."
This is possible, but the bringing of the schools in line with those already exempt
seems more plausible, due to the desire of the legislature to encourage education
by granting as liberal tax exemptions as possible, which is accomplished by ex-
empting all property owned by educational institutions, with the only qualifica-
tion being that the income derived from that property or from any other source
must be used exclusively for the purposes of education in order to be exempt from
taxation.
8 2 SuTmxAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTox 319 (3d ed. 1943).
9 152 A.CA. at 539, 314 P.2d at 213.
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The court in the principal case effects the same result as that arrived at by
Mr. Loy. In doing so, however, the court was required to give a rather broad inter-
pretation of the phrase "used exclusively" in the light of decisions in other juris-
dictions. In the jurisdictions with a "used exclusively" clause applying to all prop-
erty belonging to educational institutions, a strict interpretation is given to that
clause, noticeably in regard to faculty residences, which were not considered as
used exclusively for the purposes of education.' 0 Legal writers have recently criti-
cized two of the latest cases as giving the "used exclusively" clause too narrow
an interpretation since, they argue, it is desirable to encourage educational insti-
tutions as much as possible through tax exemption because of their importance in
terms of public and social policy." In jurisdictions where the only requirement for
exempting property belonging to educational institutions is that the property be
owned by the institutions, courts have had no trouble exempting the types of prop-
erty in question here.12 Therefore, it appears that if the court in the principal case
had based its decision on the reasoning presented by Mr. Loy, there would have
been no need for the interpretation made of the "used exclusively" clause whereby
it was required to determine whether the different types of property were "used
exclusively for the purposes of education." The court would also have found a
great deal more support from other jurisdictions. There has been some sentiment
expressed that the "used exclusively" clause should be given a broad interpreta-
tion when applying it to educational institutions, but it seems wiser for the court's
basis for its decision to be one well grounded in the law of other jurisdictions than
to go contrary to the great weight of authority, when there is a choice.
There are no previous decisions in California interpreting this particular sec-
tion of the Constitution, and it would seem desirable to find a more substantial
foundation for the decision than that given in the opinion of the court. The two
main bases for the decision appear rather weak. First of all, the greatest weight
in the opinion is given to California cases interpreting the section exempting wel-
fare and religious institutions from taxation. This analogy, we have seen, is not
well founded. Secondly, the majority of cases cited from other jurisdictions can
easily be distinguished from the present case, either based on statutory or factual
differences. 13 It would be much more desirable to give the interpretation that the
"used exclusively" clause applies only to "income," and thus the provision would
exempt all property from taxation owned by educational institutions. This inter-
pretation of the constitutional provision is a plausible one, and in applying this
10 New Canaan County School v. New Canaan, 183 Conn. 347, 84 A.2d 691 (1952); West-
ern Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91 N.E.2d 497 (1950); Knox
College v. Board of Review of Knox County, 308 Ill. 160, 139 N.E. 56 (1923).
11 Notes, 26 CoNN. B.J. 219 (1952), criticizing New Canaan County School v. New Canaan;
25 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 916 (1950), criticizing Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals.
12 Troy Conference Academy v. Poultney, 115 Vt. 480, 66 A.2d 2 (1949) ; Elder v. Trustees
of Atlanta University, 194 Ga. 716, 22 S.E.2d 515 (1942).
Is Examples of the differentiations: Midwest Bible and Missionary Institute v. Sestric,
364 Mo. 167, 260 S.W.2d 25 (1953) (buildings used both as dormitories and as faculty resi-
dences, so students had immediate access to faculty, and faculty had supervision over students) ;
People ex rel. Clarkson Memorial College v. Haggett, 191 Misc. 621, 77 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup.
1948) (the only case found in point regarding faculty residences. There was a statute similar to
the court's interpretation of the California constitutional provision. The case admits that their
interpretation is a long way from the literal application of the word "exclusively."); Mis-
souri ex rel. Spillers v. Johnson, 214 Mo. 656, 113 S.W. 1083 (1908) (headmaster's living in
school merely incidental to use of building as school; building held completely exempt).
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